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Products Liability in Texas -Fifth Circuit Imposes
Higher Duty of Care on Manufacturers of Automobiles
Plaintiff was injured when the dimmer switch on his new car mal-
functioned and the headlights went out which resulted in his driving
off the road and into a tree. The jury found that the independent
supplier of the dimmer switch had been negligent in its manufacture,
but that the assembler-manufacturer, by reasonable inspection, could
not have discovered the defect. Nevertheless, the assembler-manu-
facturer was found negligent for placing the car on the market in
its defective condition. Held, affirmed: The assembler-manufacturer
of an automobile is liable for the negligence of an independent sup-
plier of a component part.' Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis, 322 F.2d 267
(5th Cir. 1963).
In imposing liability upon manufacturers, the courts have seized
principally upon two theories, negligence and strict liability. Under
the general negligence rule, the duty placed upon manufacturers of
all products, other than those inherently dangerous, is one of
"reasonable care."' If the product is inherently dangerous, a standard
of extreme caution normally is required.' The rule holding the
assembler-manufacturer liable for injuries resulting from negligently
made component parts of his product was first set forth in the land-
mark case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.4 The New York court
held that a manufacturer breached a duty of care owed the pur-
l 322 F.2d 267, 276 (5th Cir. 1963). The case was appealed from a verdict for the
plaintiff. The jury found that the automobile was in an inherently dangerous condition,
due to the defect in the dimmer switch, that the supplier of the switch had been negligent
in its manufacture, and that Ford, by means of reasonable inspection, could not have
discovered the defect. Id. at 272 nn. 3-5. The jury also found that Ford was negligent
in marketing the car in its defective condition. Id. at 272 n.6. Appellant contended that it
could not be held guilty of negligence because it had not breached a reasonable duty of
care. Id. at 272. Additionally, appellant contended that lack of privity of contract precluded
plaintiff from recovery. Id. at 275. The court of appeals rejected both arguments and
affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id. at 276.
'MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
'Talley v. Beever & Hindes, 78 S.W. 23 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903). As distinguished from
an imminently dangerous product, a product is said to be inherently dangerous when it is
dangerous per se. Privity of contract is not necessary to recover in cases concerning in-
herently dangerous products. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Wallace, 69 S.W.2d 857(Tex. Civ. App. 1934) error dism.; Brown Cracker & Candy Co. v. Jensen, 32 S.W.2d 227(Tex. Civ. App. 1930); Texas Drug Co. v. Cadwell, 237 S.W. 968 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922)
error ref.; Cohn v. Saenz, 211 S.W. 492 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) error ref.; Armstrong
Packing Co. v. Clem, 151 S.W. 576 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) error ref.
Imminently dangerous products are those which are not dangerous by nature, but which
are dangerous because of some defect in their manufacture. Dunn v. Texas Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 84 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) error dism. Privity of contract is
not necessary to recovery when the product is imminently dangerous. International Derrick
& Equip. Co. v. Croix, 241 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1957); Johnson v. Murray Co., 90 S.W.2d
920 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) error dism.
'217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
NOTES
chaser by marketing a product without first subjecting it to tests
commensurate with the amount of danger involved if the product
proved defective.! This rule was adopted by the Texas court of civil
appeals in Blickman v. Chilton.' It should be noted that in MacPher-
son and Blickman, although the defective component was negligently
manufactured by an independent supplier, there was no finding, as
in the principal case, that the manufacturer could not have dis-
covered the defect by a reasonable inspection of the finished product.!
The alternative theories by which liability may be imposed upon
a manufacturer for defects in his product are varying forms of strict
liability. One of the most common of these theories is the action of
implied warranty of merchantability, which is a contractual action.!
A more recent theory is that of strict liability in tort, which does not
depend upon a basis of warranty." Another is of an in-between
sort; in it liability is predicated upon "the broad principle of
the public policy to protect health and life.""0 Although there is
a trend among other jurisdictions toward applying some form of
strict liability to an increasing number of products,1 Texas has thus
far limited recovery on its "public policy" theory to food cases."2
In the principal case, the Fifth Circuit was faced with the liability
of an assembler-manufacturer for his supplier's negligence even
though the assembler-manufacturer could not have discovered the
defect by reasonable inspection." The court relied upon section 400
of the Restatement of Torts as the principal basis of recovery. 4 "One
8 Id. at 1051.
114 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938). In this case, a negligently manufactured
,lunch counter stool was supplied to the contractor-defendant. Whether the defendant could
have found the defect by means of a reasonable inspection was not submitted to the jury.
Id. at 648. However, the stool was defectively made and the plaintiff was injured while
using it. Id. at 648.
7 See notes 5, 6 supra. Also see Hooper v. General Motors Corp., 123 Utah 515, 260 P.2d
549 (1953): "Thus, to impose liability on an assembler of an automobile certain necessary
elements must be made out. Plaintiff is required to show: (1) A defective wheel at the
time of the automobile assembly; (2) Such defect being discoverable by reasonable inspec-
tion; (3) Injury caused by failure of the wheel due to its defective condition." Id. at 551.
'Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78, 98 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 149 (9th
Cir. 1962); Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413, 418 (1954);
Esborg v. Bailey Drug Co., 61 Wash. 2d 347, 378 P.2d 298, 304-305 (1963).
9 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 27 Cal. 697, 377 P.2d 897, 900 (1962),
noted in 17 Sw. L.J. 669 (1963).
10 Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828, 829 (1942).
" See Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78, 119 (D. Hawaii 1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 149
(9th Cir. 1962), for a list of jurisdictions which have accepted some form of strict liability.12 Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942). In Brown
v. Howard, 285 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref. n.r.e., the court refused
to extend the implied warranty rule of Decker to a cattle spray because the injury was
not to human health or life.
3 322 F.2d at 276.
14 id. at 272, 274.
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who puts out as his own product a chattel manufactured by another
is subject to the same liability as though he were its manufacturer." ''
The effect is to impute the negligence of a supplier to the assembler-
manufacturer."8 Apparently, the basis for the application of section
400 is one of public policy. The courts following section 400 have
reasoned that since manufacturers induce customers to rely upon the
quality of their finished products, it is reasonable to impose liability
upon a manufacturer when an injury results from a defective part
supplied by another.' The court, in the principal case, noted that
section 400 incorporates section 395" by which liability is imposed
upon a manufacturer (supplier) who fails to use reasonable care in
the manufacture of a chattel which will, unless carefully made, cause
an unreasonable risk of injury to those who use it." In holding that
the fact situation before the court fell within the rule of section 395,
the court was able to employ section 400 in imputing the supplier's
negligence to the assembler-manufacturer."0 Finally, the opinion re-
sorted to an unnecessary extension of implied warranty to reject
Ford's argument that lack of privity of contract barred recovery by
the plaintiff."1
As precedent for applying section 400, the court cited"' Blickman
v. Chilton." Although BlickmanU did cite section 400 as an ap-
plicable principle of Texas law, that case can be distinguished from
Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis." In Blickman,8 the controlling issue was
not the imputing of negligence from the supplier to the contractor
(assembler-manufacturer in the principal case), but was the inter-
vening act of a third party and the lack of privity of contract."7 The
question whether the defendant could have discovered the defect by
reasonable inspection was not submitted to the jury.8 Therefore, in
relying on section 400, the court of civil appeals did not face the
problem of imputing negligence to a defendant who had met his
reasonable duty of care.
15 Restatement, Torts S 400 (1934).
'e 322 F.2d at 276 n.18.
"Id. at 274. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436, 443
(1944); Graham v. Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413, 417 (1954); Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 81 (1960).
s Ibid.
Is Restatement, Torts § 395 (1934); see Restatement, Torts § 395 (Supp. 1949).
20 322 F.2d at 274-75.
21 Id. at 275.
22 Id. at 272.
23 114 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
24 Id. at 649.
' 322 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1963).
'o 114 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).2
7 Id. at 648-50.
2
s Id. at 648.
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Regardless of the application of Blickman,," a more serious objec-
tion exists to the adoption of section 400 as a general rule of Texas
negligence law. Before proximate cause can be charged to a defen-
dant, the plaintiff must prove the defendant breached a duty of
reasonable care owed to the plaintiff.0 Imputing the negligence of a
supplier to an assembler-manufacturer, even though the latter could
not have discovered the defect by reasonable inspection, seemingly
violates this accepted concept of proximate cause. Apparently, the
only means by which the defect can be attributed to the assembler-
manufacturer without violating the meaning of proximate cause is
by substituting a higher standard of care for the normal duty of
reasonable inspection. But in affirming the trial court's finding that
an automobile equipped with a defective dimmer switch is inherently
dangerous, 1 the court did exactly this. An inherently dangerous
product, the court reasoned, necessarily involves an unreasonable risk
and therefore the commensurate duty of care is increased substan-
tially,"3 even to a level which cannot be met easily or practically."
It should be recognized that the above argument is merely a nominal
attempt at preserving the doctrine of proximate cause when the
assembler-manufacturer could not have discovered, by reasonable in-
spection, the defect in the component part. The very fact that the
court was not concerned with such a justification of proximate cause,
coupled with the emphasis placed on the public policy rationale, 4
may be an indication that the court was more concerned with imple-
menting a limited form of strict liability than it was with following
rules of negligence law.
In addition to the adoption of section 400, the court strongly
suggested that public policy may be asserted as an independent theory
of imputing negligence to the manufacturer." In today's world of
merchandising, purchasers rarely distinguish between the assembler-
manufacturer and the supplier, nor does the manufacturer wish them
2"114 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
30Guthrie v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 320 S.W.2d 396, 398 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) error ref.
n.r.e.; Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 Texas L. Rev. 471, 761-64
(1950).
3' 322 F.2d at 274-75.
"2 Ibid.
"That the court was not concerned particularly with whether the defendant possibly
could meet the duty of care imposed is shown by the heavy emphasis placed upon the
public policy argument and the implied warranty theory. See notes 35-47 infra and
accompanying text.
34See notes 33-36 infra. "To hold the assembler liable for the negligence of its com-
ponent-part manufacturer appears to be a sound and realistic doctrine . . . this principle
surely reflects the outlook of this modern world of big business advertising in a big way."




to do so." When advertising leads a purchaser to rely upon the quality
of a finished product, the manufacturer should be required to stand
behind the quality of the product, including its component parts."
Even though this public policy argument is being adopted by an
increasing number of jurisdictions,"8 it encounters the same criticism
as all other public policy arguments, viz., the substitution of results
for causes and economic balancing for legal analysis.89
In its treatment of the privity issue, the Fifth Circuit indicated a
favorable inclination toward the application of implied warranty to
automobile cases. Ford contended that the plaintiff was barred from
recovery because he was not in privity. ' In cases of both inherently
and imminently dangerous products, the need for privity has long
been abolished in negligence law.41 The court easily could have ap-
plied this rule and dismissed the issue, but instead it chose to reject
the privity argument by reference to implied warranty cases.' In
pointing out that the category of products included in the implied
warranty area is continually expanding," the court cited as precedent
the now famous case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc."
That case held an automobile manufacturer liable on an implied
warranty of merchantibility for injuries caused by a defect in one
of its products." Judge Brown even leaned heavily upon the Hen-
ningsen"' language in expressing his belief that the Supreme Court
of Texas will not "differentiate between a Texan killed by a microbe
and one killed by a negligently defective machine hurtling through
space at great, but expected speed." 7 It may readily be observed that
such a treatment of implied warranty adds nothing to negligence
law, upon which the present case supposedly is decided.
In Ford Motor Co.,48 the assembler-manufacturer actually was
3, Id. at 274. Whether public policy alone may be a sufficient ground on which to
impute the supplier's negligence to the assembler-manufacturer is not clear. Although
§ 400 has its roots in public policy, the emphasis and the space devoted to the merchandising
factor in the opinion arguably may serve as a separate ground for imputing negligence from
the supplier to the assembler-manufacturer.
m Ibid.
a See note 11 supra.
a Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers For Injuries Caused By Defects In Products-
An Opposing View, 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 938, 945-46 (1957).
40 322 F.2d at 275.
41 See note 3 supra.
4 322 F.2d at 275.
4"Id. at 275 nn.14, 15.
432 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
Ibid.
Ibid.
47 322 F.2d at 276. The exact language of Henningsen is, "We see no rational doctrinal
basis for differentiating between a fly in a bottle of beverage and a defective automobile."
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 83 (1960).
48 322 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1963).
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